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THE CHILD PROTECTION ACT: A BLANKET
PROHIBITION SMOTHERING
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
EXPRESSION
"Those Young Girls," an erotic film featuring Traci Lords, is the
origin of United States v. Kantor.' In "Those Young Girls," Lords was
required to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of film-
ing.2 Two years after the film's release, it was discovered that Lords was
merely sixteen years old at the time of filming.3 Because of Lords' age,
Ronald Rene Kantor and Rupert Sebastian MacNee, the producers, were
indicted4 under 18 U.S.C. section 2251 et seq. (the "Child Protection
Act").5 The Child Protection Act makes it unlawful to employ persons
under the age of eighteen to engage in sexually explicit conduct, actual or
simulated, for the purpose of filming or photography.6
Defendants Kantor and MacNee moved to dismiss the indictment,
claiming section 2251(a), as applied, violated both the First and Fifth
1. United States v. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
2. Id. at 1422.
3. Id at 1423.
4. Id. at 1422.
5. Section 2251 was the critical portion of the Child Protection Act discussed in Kantor.
At the time of the indictment, the statute provided in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any
minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in.... any
sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such
conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (c), if such person knows or
has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported in interstate or
foreign commerce or mall, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported in
interstate or foreign commerce or mailed....
(c) Any individual who violates this section shall be fined no more than
$100,000, or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, but, if such individual has a
prior conviction under this section, such individual shall be fined not more than
$200,000, or imprisoned not less than two years, more than 15 years, or both....
Section 2255(1) provided that "minor" means any person under the age of eighteen years. 18
U.S.C. § 2251 (1982); Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1422 n.1. Additionally, § 2255(2) provided:
(2) "sexually explicit conduct" means actual or simulated-
(A) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-
anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex;
(B) bestiality;
(C) masturbation;
(D) sadistic or masochistic; abuse; or
(E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.
18 U.S.C. § 2255(2) (1982); Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1422 n.l.
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2256 (1988).
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Amendments of the United States Constitution.' Specifically, the de-
fendants alleged that the statute was overbroad under the first amend-
ment overbreadth doctrine.' Additionally, Kantor and MacNee
contended that section 2251(a) was unconstitutional under the fifth
amendment unless it required the government to prove the defendants'
actual knowledge that Lords was under eighteen.9 In the alternative, the
defendants contended that even if such proof was not constitutionally
required, they must be permitted to show that they acted on the basis of a
reasonable, good faith mistake of fact concerning Lords' age.1"
The government proceeded to prosecute the action claiming that
Ms. Lords was sixteen at the time of filming, that the defendants were
her employers and that they knew the film would be transported in inter-
state commerce.1 The government alleged that proof of scienter was not
an issue under section 225 1(a), thus, the defendants' knowledge of Lords'
actual age was not contended. In fact, the government filed a motion in
limine to prevent the defendants from introducing any evidence as to the
state of their knowledge or belief concerning Lords' age. 12 The court
concluded that both the defendants' motion to dismiss and the govern-
ment's motion in litnine must be denied.' 3
I. SUMMARY OF THE KANTOR COURT'S REASONING
United States v. Kantor, a case of first impression in the Ninth Cir-
cuit,14 tests the constitutionality of the Child Protection Act. 5 The de-
fendants, Kantor and MacNee, argued that under both the first and fifth
amendments the government was required to prove that the producers
knew Lords' actual age.' 6 The court disagreed, concluding that the gov-
ernment would be required only to prove that Kantor and MacNee knew
7. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1423.
8. A court uses the overbreadth doctrine when a statute or other governmental restric-
tion, directed at speech which in itself is not protected by the first amendment, is sufficiently
broad so as also to prohibit speech which is protected under the first amendment. Such restric-
tions may be perfectly constitutional, but nevertheless "overbroad," or invalid "on its face,"
for the reason that their reach also extends to protected speech. In this situation, the person
charged with violation of the restriction has standing to assert the invalidity of the restriction
notwithstanding the fact that his speech is not in itself constitutionally protected. M. NIM-
MER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4-147 (1984).
9. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1423.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1422.
12. Id. at 1423.
13. Id.
14. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1422.
15. See supra note 5.
16. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1423.
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that the "nature and character" of the materials produced were sexually
explicit. 7 Once the government proves Kantor and MacNee knew the
nature and content of "Those Young Girls" (child pornography), then
almost by definition the defendants must know the film depicts minors.
Therefore, the defendants would possess the guilty knowledge required
for conviction.
Next, the defendants argued that their reasonable mistake of fact as
to Lords' age was an affirmative defense.' 8 Although conceding that sec-
tion 2251(a) does not make reasonable mistake of age an affirmative de-
fense, the defendants contended that the statute must be construed as
implicitly providing for such a defense.' 9 The court agreed with the de-
fendants stating that, on remand, the defendants must be given the op-
portunity to prove the reasonableness of their mistake.2"
In support of its conclusion, the court noted that strict liability for
criminal offenses is justified only in three circumstances: "(1) where the
legislature grants the privilege to engage in the activity; (2) where the
deterrent effect of a severe penalty is necessary to prevent harm to the
public interest; and (3) where basic notions of fairness are not upset by
criminal conviction."
2'
The court found the first condition was not applicable. The right to
produce pornographic materials with adult performers is not granted by
Congress; instead it is a freedom of expression protected by the Constitu-
tion.2 2 Additionally, the court held that the remaining two justifications
for strict liability were also inapplicable. The court reasoned that a de-
fense of reasonable mistake of fact would not undermine the deterrent
value of a severe penalty; rather, it would encourage individuals to make
a careful investigation of age before engaging in sexual filming.23 Finally,
the court held that notions of fairness demand that a person who will be
imprisoned for a long term based upon a factual error must be afforded
the defense of a good faith reasonable mistake of fact.24 Because section
2251 regulates pornography to prevent the employment of underaged
performers, performers knowing they will be denied employment have
every incentive to falsify their age. Therefore, the court held that an
employer should not face a long jail term, due to deliberate deception and
17. Id. at 1429.
18. Id. at 1423.
19. Id.
20. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1435.
21. Id. at 1433.
22. U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.
23. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1434.
24. Id. at 1435.
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trickery on behalf of a performer, without the opportunity to prove hon-
est mistake of fact.2 5
Accordingly, the court ruled that the defendants would be allowed
to present evidence to prove a reasonable mistake of fact as an affirmative
defense.26 Therefore, the court denied the government's motion to ex-
clude evidence regarding Kantor and MacNee's knowledge concerning
Lords' actual age.27
In addition to the opportunity to prove their reasonable mistake of
fact, Kantor and MacNee argued that section 2251(a) violated the first
amendment by virtue of its overbreadth. 2' The court, therefore, ad-
dressed the question of whether the Child Protection Act, under the first
amendment overbreadth doctrine,29 had a chilling effect on constitution-
ally protected expression. In particular, the court focused on the stat-
ute's proscription of "simulated" sexual conduct as applied to sixteen
and seventeen-year-oldsa °
The court concluded that the definition of "sexually explicit con-
duct" under section 2251(a) was not suitably limited "in that the poten-
tial encroachment upon the first amendment is not properly directed to
the legitimate objectives of protection of children from the abuses of
child pornography. 3 1  Section 2251 et seq. infringes upon the first
amendment rights of all those involved in artistic expression, not merely
teenage actors; thus, its encroachment upon the first amendment is not
properly directed towards the goal of protecting children. Nevertheless,
based on the collective view of the Supreme Court in New York v. Fer-
ber,32 the court "reluctantly" determined that section 2251(a) could not
be struck down facially, at least until challenged by a party affected by
the statute's alleged overbreadth 3
A. Fifth Amendment Issues
The indictment posed two questions under the fifth amendment:
(1) whether Congress can criminalize the employment of an underaged
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id
28. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1423.
29. See supra note 8.
30. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1429.
31. Id. at 1432.
32. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
33. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1432. "Those Young Girls" falls directly within the category
of speech covered by the Child Protection Act, thus Kantor and MacNee are not presently
affected by the statute's alleged overbreadth.
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performer for filming without requiring proof of the defendant's knowl-
edge of the performer's actual age; and (2) if Congress can criminalize
this conduct, whether it can prescribe so severe a penalty for violation as
that under section 2251(a).34 Analyzing section 2251(a) solely by refer-
ence to the fifth amendment, the court answered these questions in the
affirmative 5 and dismissed the defendants' fifth amendment claims.
Recognizing that the activity being regulated in Kantor is child por-
nography, not the employment of children, the court applied the
Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Ferber.36 The Supreme Court
in Ferber established that Congress has the authority to regulate child
pornography for the protection of children. 7 The Kantor court found,
when regulating child pornography, Congress leaves the responsibility of
conforming one's conduct within the scope of the law upon those who
participate in such activities.38 In such situations it is irrelevant whether
the defendants knew or should have known they were violating the law
by employing an underaged performer such as Lords.39 Therefore, Con-
gress has the authority to implement section 2251(a) and define the de-
fendants' conduct as criminal.'
With respect to the second question regarding the severity of the
penalty, the Kantor court acknowledged that "due process dictates that
not too severe a penalty be attached to crimes which do not require an
element of criminal intent."4 However, these due process concerns must
be balanced against other societal interests.42 Relying on congressional
findings that indicate the harm to children which flows from engaging in
sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of filming is severe, the
Supreme Court has found the interest in protecting children is compel-
ling.43 Because Congress looked at the harm to the minor as the basis for
establishing the section 2251 penalty, rather than to the subjective culpa-
34. Id. at 1426. Section 2251(c) provided:
Any individual who violates this section shall be fined no more than $100,000, or
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, but, if such individual has a prior con-
viction under this section, such individual shall be fined not more than $200,000, or
imprisoned not less than two years, more than 15 years, or both. Any organization
which violates this section shall be fined not more than $250,000.
18 U.S.C. § 2251(c) (1982).
35. Id. at 1426-28.
36. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
37. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1426.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1427.
42. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1427.
43. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57.
1989]
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bility of the employer, the Kantor court concluded that Congress did not
exceed its power by attaching a severe penalty to section 2251 et seq."
B. First Amendment Issues
Filmmaking is a form of protected expression under the first amend-
ment.4 5 Because of the importance of the free speech guarantee, Con-
gress cannot prohibit altogether the filming of sexually explicit conduct.
When Congress does regulate in this area, its legislative power must be so
exercised as not to unduly infringe upon this protected freedom. Section
2251(a), however, is potentially so broad that it has a chilling effect on
constitutionally protected speech. The statute proscribes materials tradi-
tionally entitled to constitutional protection from governmental interfer-
ence such as art work, plays and films where a child portrays a simulated
sexual act in a nonobscene manner. Additionally, medical and educa-
tional materials depicting adolescents in the proscribed manner are pro-
hibited by the statute.
The critical portion of the Child Protection Act analyzed in Kantor
is section 2251(a). In general, section 2251(a) makes it unlawful to em-
ploy persons under the age of eighteen to engage in "sexually explicit
conduct" for the purpose of filming or photography where "sexually ex-
plicit conduct" is defined as actual or simulated sexual intercourse.46
The statute provides in pertinent part:
Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or
coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any
other person to engage in. . . any sexually explicit conduct for
the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct,
shall be punished as provided under subsection (d), if such per-
son knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will
be transported in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, or
if such visual depiction has actually been transported in inter-
state or foreign commerce or mailed.47
The statutory definition of "sexually explicit conduct" is not suita-
bly limited and described.4 Additionally, the societal interest which jus-
tifies restricting first amendment rights in protecting individuals between
the ages of sixteen and eighteen is strained.49 Consequently, the expan-
44. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1428.
45. Id.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) (1988).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (1988).
48. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1432.
49. Id. at 1429.
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sive scope of the Child Protection Act infringes upon the fundamental
liberties guaranteed by the first amendment.
II. CASE AND LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
A. The Landmark Case of New York v. Ferber
The overbreadth issues in Kantor arose out of the Supreme Court's
decision in Ferber. Paul Ferber, the proprietor of a New York bookstore
specializing in sexually oriented products, was indicted for selling sexu-
ally explicit films in violation of New York's child pornography laws.5 °
The New York statute in Ferber was similar to section 2251(a) of the
Child Protection Act in two ways. First, the New York statute did not
require proof of obscenity if the materials depicted children engaged in
sexual conduct.5" Second, it defined sexually explicit conduct as "actual
or simulated sexual intercourse." 52 A "child" for purposes of the New
York statute is "a child less than sixteen years of age."
53
Ferber, like Kantor and MacNee, challenged the constitutionality of
the New York statute under the first amendment "overbreadth doc-
trine."54 Ferber argued that the statute was "unconstitutionally over-
broad because it would forbid the distribution of material with serious
literary, scientific, or educational value or material which does not
threaten the harms sought to be combated by the State."5
Applying the New York statute, the equivalent of the Child Protec-
tion Act, a jury acquitted Ferber of the obscenity charges, but found him
guilty of both counts of promoting a sexual performance by a child.56
The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division
of the New York State Supreme Court.57 The New York Court of Ap-
peals reversed, holding that the New York Act violated the first amend-
ment. 58 The New York Court of Appeals held that without the inclusion
of the obscenity standard, the statute would "prohibit the promotion of
materials which are traditionally entitled to constitutional protection
from government interference under the First Amendment. ' 59 In reach-
50. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751-52.
51. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00 (McKINNEY 1980).
52. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(3) (McKINNEY 1980).
53. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.05 (McKINNEY 1980).
54. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 766.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 752.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 678, 422 N.E.2d 523, 525 (1981), rev'd 458 U.S. 747
(1982).
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ing this conclusion, the court referred to plays and films which would be
prohibited by the statute if a child portrayed a defined sexual act, real or
simulated, in a nonobscene manner. Furthermore, the court noted that
the law would "prohibit the sale, showing, or distributing of medical or
educational materials containing photographs of such acts. ''61
The United States Supreme Court granted the state's petition for
certiorari. 62 The issue was whether, to prevent the abuse of children, the
New York State Legislature could, consistent with the first amendment,
prohibit the dissemination of materials depicting children engaged in sex-
ual conduct, regardless of whether such materials were obscene. 63 The
Court answered this question affirmatively, holding that the New York
statute did not violate the first amendment." In upholding the statute,65
the Court created a new class of unprotected speech and recognized for
the first time that there is a difference between child pornography and
adult pornography. In his opinion for the five member majority, Justice
White stated five reasons to justify why the states should have greater
leeway in the regulation of child pornography.66
Applying the first amendment overbreadth doctrine,67 the Supreme
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 753.
63. Id.
64. Id at 773-74.
65. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 1980): "A person is guilty of promoting a
sexual performance by a child when knowing the character and content thereof, he produces,
directs or promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than six-
teen years of age."
66. First, Justice White asserted that the state's interest in protecting the physical and
emotional welfare of children is compelling. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57. Second, the majority
found the Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), guideline for determining what is legally
obscene an unsatisfactory solution to the child pornography problem. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
A sexually explicit depiction of a child need not be patently offensive or appeal to the prurient
interest, as required in adult pornography, in order to have required the sexual exploitation of
a child for its production. Id. Third, the majority recognized that advertising and selling of
child pornography provide an economic motive and are thus an integral part of the production
of new child pornography, an illegal activity in all fifty states. Id Fourth, the Court stated
that the social value of allowing children to engage in sexual conduct for purposes of filming is
"exceedingly modest, if not de minimis." Id. at 762. Finally, Justice White explained that it is
acceptable to classify speech on the basis of its content when the "evil to be restricted so
overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests." Id. at 763-64. The Court concluded that
when the societal interest in the welfare of children is balanced against the first amendment
interests of child pornography "the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and it is
permissible to consider these materials as without the protection of the First Amendment."
Id at 764.
67. Initially the Court discussed the issue of standing. The Court stated that "[t]he tradi-
tional rule is that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not chal-
lenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others
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Court held that the New York statute was not constitutionally invalid
because it was not substantially overbroad.6" Writing for the majority,
Justice White explained this conclusion as the case of a state statute, di-
rected at the hard core of child pornography, "whose legitimate reach
dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications."69 This meant that
although some protected expression would fall prey to the statute, the
Court felt it would not amount to more than a tiny fraction and whatever
overbreadth may exist would be cured by a case-by-case analysis of the
fact situation.7"
The Ferber Court's explanation is a mere rationalization used to jus-
tify its inadequate decision. The Court failed to explain or provide a
standard indicating how much overbreadth must be apparent before the
overbreadth doctrine will be applied." Rather, the Court decided the
permissible scope of a statute's potential overbreadth would be left to a
case-by-case analysis.72 The Court acknowledged instances of over-
breadth flowing from the New York statute yet they concluded that the
statute was not overbroad.73 The Court appears to be sensitive to the
issue of child pornography, however, such biases have colored its deci-
sion and limited its application to the specific facts in Ferber.
The "scope and ramifications of the Ferber Court's rejection of the
defendant's overbreadth argument are very much at issue" in Kantor.74
Congress was prompted to amend the Child Protection Act in response
to Ferber and the concern for child protection.75 Such changes, however,
have a potential chilling effect on films and other forms of expression far
beyond the encroachment considered in Ferber.
B. The Child Protection Act of 1984
In 1978, Congress passed the Protection of Children Against Sexual
in situations not before the Court." Id at 767. An exception to this principle is recognized as
the first amendment overbreadth doctrine, which developed due to the Court's concern that
people who wish to engage in legally protected expression may refrain from doing so rather
than risk prosecution. Id. at 768. Furthermore, the Court stated that the seriousness of strik-
ing down a statute on its face requires that the overbreadth involved must be substantial before
a facial invalidation may occur. Id. at 769.
68. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 774.
71. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1425.
72. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 774.
73. Id. at 773.
74. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1424.
75. See infra note 78.
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Abuse Act,7 6 which was designed to protect children from sexual abuse.
This statute made it unlawful to knowingly sell or distribute for commer-
cial purposes magazines, films or any other material containing pictures
of children engaged in obscene sexual conduct." The 1978 Act, how-
ever, was ineffective and failed to provide adequate protection for chil-
dren.78 The ineffectiveness was attributed to the statutory requirements
that the materials must be both obscene and distributed for commercial
purposes.
In an attempt to resolve these weaknesses, Congress enacted the
Child Protection Act of 1984. 7 9 This Act dramatically enlarged the Pro-
tection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1978 in an at-
tempt to facilitate the prosecution and enforcement of child pornography
laws.
Most significantly, Congress deleted the obscenity requirement ex-
tending prosecution to nonobscene sexually explicit materials. Congress
felt that eliminating the obscenity element would streamline prosecution
and expedite trial preparation and the trial itself.
80
Additionally, Congress amended the definition of "minor" under
the Act by raising the age of majority from sixteen to eighteen years of
age. Although the child protection law upheld in Ferber applied only to
children sixteen and under, the legislators felt that protecting sixteen and
seventeen-year-olds would be constitutional as well. 8 '
III. ANALYSIS
In the wake of Ferber and congressional amendments to the Child
Protection Act, the first amendment analysis in Kantor focused on the
following questions: (1) Whether the societal interest in protecting chil-
dren, the justification for restricting rights otherwise secured by the first
amendment, extends to individuals between the ages of sixteen and eight-
een; (2) whether the definition of "sexually explicit conduct" is suitably
limited and described; and (3) whether section 2251(a) should be struck
76. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (Supp. 11 1978).
77. Id.
78. H.R. REP. No. 536, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS. 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 492, 500. A Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal
Division testified, at the House Subcommittee on Crime hearings in 1982, that no individual
had been convicted for producing child pornography under the 1978 Act since its enactment
and only 23 people were convicted for selling child pornography. Id.
79. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2256 (1988) (signed into law on May 21, 1984 by President
Reagan).
80. See supra note 78, at 502.
81. See supra note 78, at 505.
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down under the overbreadth doctrine in order to avoid its chilling effect
on constitutionally protected speech.
82
A. Protection of Sixteen and Seventeen-Year-Olds
The increase in the specified age in the Child Protection Act, from
sixteen to eighteen, jeopardizes the Act's constitutionality under the first
amendment overbreadth doctrine. Section 2251(a) is a blanket prohibi-
tion with no exceptions. The Child Protection Act is capable of applica-
tion in such a manner as to prohibit or punish protected speech. Under
absolutely no circumstances may seventeen-year- old actors volunteer to
perform nonobscene simulated sexual conduct for motion pictures or the-
atrical productions nor may their parents consent to such perform-
ances.8 3 The Act's statutory language of "simulated sexual conduct," as
applied to sixteen and seventeen-year-olds, must be questioned because
the mandatory compelling state interest which justifies abridging free
speech is lacking.
The societal interest in protecting sixteen and seventeen-year-old
"children" from simulating nonobscene sexual conduct is strained. 4 As
the age in the Act is progressively increased "there comes a point at
which the prohibition against employing underage performers becomes a
transparent means for prohibiting the performance itself.... That point
is reached when the affected performers are sufficiently 'adult' so as to be
no longer the legitimate subjects of protection of 'children.' "85 The Kan-
tor court concluded that, because Congress cannot prohibit the filming of
all sexually explicit conduct under the first amendment, Ferber stands for
the proposition that Congress can "prohibit the use only of those who
truly are children in such performances."86 Society's concern for pro-
tecting sixteen and seventeen-year-olds as "children" is tenuous. At age
eighteen such individuals are regarded as "adults" in circumstances such
as voting rights and mandatory draft registration requirements.8 7 Fur-
thermore, as children reach this age the physical acts to be performed on
film become more natural to the performers. Therefore, Congress may
not be protecting young adults from engaging in physical acts with which
they would otherwise have no experience. 88
82. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1428.
83. Id. at 1430.
84. Id at 1429.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1430 n.43.
88. Id.
1989]
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Legislative history reveals and confirms that the requisite compel-
ling state interest is lacking. Congress was not motivated by a concern
for people between the ages of sixteen and eighteen when it amended the
statutory age. Rather, Congress wanted to facilitate the prosecution of
cases involving thirteen and fourteen-year-olds. Mark Richard, a Dep-
uty Assistant Attorney General, stated: "[i]f the law were amended to
protect minors under the age of 18, rather than 16, it would be easier to
prosecute cases in which 14 or 15-year olds have been sexually exploited,
but regarding whom actual proof of age is not available."8 9 Congress
hoped to aid prosecutors in identifying the age of those depicted since
some thirteen and fourteen-year-olds might pass for sixteen, but they
would seldom pass for eighteen. This rationale and justification of pro-
tecting children does not support abridging first amendment rights under
these circumstances. Congress must use less restrictive alternatives to
facilitate the prosecution process.
The Ferber majority concluded, consistent with the first amend-
ment, that the New York statute could prohibit the dissemination of non-
obscene sexually explicit materials because the specified statutory age
was merely sixteen. This conclusion, however, cannot be reached under
the Child Protection Act. The Act was never meant to protect sixteen
and seventeen-year- olds. Furthermore, the societal interest in protecting
children, articulated in Ferber, does not justify restricting such an indi-
vidual's first amendment rights. It is inappropriate for Congress to limit
constitutionally protected behavior in an attempt to facilitate the prose-
cution of cases involving children less than sixteen years old.
B. The Suitability of the Definition of "Sexually Explicit Conduct"
The definition of "sexually explicit conduct," as defined in the Child
Protection Act, is practically identical to the definition of "sexual con-
duct" in the New York statute discussed in Ferber. The change in the
specified age from sixteen to eighteen, however, necessitates a more care-
ful examination of the suitability of such definition.
1. Sexual Intercourse
The Child Protection Act, like the statute upheld in Ferber, defines
sexually explicit conduct as "actual or simulated sexual intercourse."'
Unlike the New York statute, section 2256(2) uses the word "including"
followed by a list of four specific sexual contacts. Specifically, the four
89. See supra note 78, at 505.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) (1988).
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sexual contacts listed are: genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital and
oral-anal. 9 ' Congress' use of the word "including" expanded the defini-
tion of sexual intercourse: "Conventional principles of construction sug-
gest that, from the use of the term 'including,' it may be presumed that
there are other acts which also fall within the definition.
'92
Congress' open-ended definition of sexually explicit conduct is over-
inclusive. In fact, it is possible that Congress did not intend to limit the
definition to the four acts specifically listed.93 However, Congress' fail-
ure to establish a limit on the potential overbroad reach of the statute
results in its infringement upon speech protected by the first amendment.
A case-by-case evaluation of various sexual contacts depicted on film to
determine whether they are within the meaning of the statute would not
be an inviting prospect for judges and juries.94 The term "including"
should be deleted from section 2255(2) to quash this overinclusiveness.
Furthermore, if the specified age in the Child Protection Act had been
left at sixteen, like the New York statute in Ferber, then most likely "po-
tential problems with the definition of 'sexual intercourse' in Section
2251(a) would be 'suitably limited,' and any potential overbreadth"
could be analyzed later when raised by the facts of a specific case.95
2. Simulated Sexual Intercourse
The Child Protection Act forbids nonpornographic depictions of
sixteen and seventeen-year- olds simulating sexual conduct. Unlike the
potential overbreadth discussed in Ferber, the possible number of in-
stances of sixteen and seventeen-year- olds simulating sexual conduct for
nonpornographic films is not a tiny fraction.96
Kantor recognized that with respect to children fifteen or younger,
there is little reason to portray them on film doing acts resembling sexual
intercourse other than to produce pornographic materials.97 Therefore,
the court felt, with respect to fifteen-year-olds, there was "little reason to
focus on the fact that 'sexually explicit conduct' is defined so to include
both actual and simulated conduct."98 However, the same cannot be
said when the statute is applied to sixteen and seventeen-year- olds:
Major motion pictures intended for mass distribution may call
91. Id
92. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1430.
93. Id.
94. Id
95. Id. at 1431.
96. Id
97. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1431.
98. Id
1989]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
for the simulation of sexual intercourse, by characters portray-
ing older teenagers, in roles which are otherwise not generally
considered pornographic. When young people have reached an
age where some forms of sexual intimacy can no longer be con-
sidered unnatural as experienced in their private lives, it be-
comes increasingly likely that some form of visual depiction,
short of pornography, of these forms of intimacy will become
part of serious artistic works.9 9
The Ferber decision permits the government to suppress speech for
purposes unrelated to any societal harm caused by the expression it-
self."° The congressional objective of the Child Protection Act was to
protect children from sexual abuse, however, the inclusion of simulated
conduct goes far beyond this objective. To achieve a simulation of sexual
intercourse, young actors can perform entirely innocuous physical acts
which may create a lascivious visual effect.' 0 ' The Child Protection
Act's blanket prohibition, which dictates that no one under eighteen be
allowed to perform the most innocuous physical acts in simulation, goes
well beyond Congress' legitimate interest of child protection.102
The undifferentiated inclusion of simulated sexual conduct in the
definition of "sexually explicit conduct" renders the Child Protection
Act substantially overbroad when applied to sixteen and seventeen-year-
olds. The Act abridges young actors' first amendment communicative
processes by forbidding their participation in nonpornographic roles
which require the simulation of sexual intercourse.
C. The Chilling Effect of the Child Protection Act on Constitutionally
Protected Expression
The Ferber Court failed to provide meaningful guidance for the ap-
plication of the overbreadth doctrine to specific facts. The majority
failed to articulate how much overbreadth would be tolerated in the po-
tential reach of a statute before such statute would unconstitutionally
chill the exercise of legitimate first amendment rights. 0 3 The Supreme
Court opinion in Ferber, composed of the collective views of the Justices,
made clear "only that a majority of the members of the Court were able
to reconcile other differences in principle on the basis of a shared view
99. Id.
100. Comment, Child Pornography: Ban The Speech And Spare The Child? New York v.
Ferber, 32 DE PAUL L. REV. 685, 705 (1983).
101. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1431.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1425.
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that the overbreadth of the New York statute was de minimis. ' '10 4
The Child Protection Act's potential chilling effect on films and
other forms of protected expression is unacceptable. Kantor concluded
that the amount of tolerable overbreadth "depends on how clearly the
permitted encroachment is necessary for the legitimate protection of chil-
dren, and on how narrowly any overbreadth encroaches on expressions
deemed to have marginal first amendment value."' 5 In effect, the Kan-
tor court provides a two-part analysis: first, whether it is truly necessary
to abridge free expression in order to protect children and, second, if it is
necessary to abridge such expression, then to what extent does such over-
breadth abridge protected expression. Applying this standard to the
facts in Kantor, the court recognized that the artistic expression in the
film "Those Young Girls" is the most marginal type of expression pro-
tected by the first amendment.' °6 However, many other forms of expres-
sion depicting older teenagers simulating nonobscene sexual conduct
warrant first amendment protection and are forbidden by section
2251(a). The statute reaches a substantial number of impermissible ap-
plications. For example, such depictions as photographs incorporated in
pediatric medicine texts, sculptures such as Donatello's David and films
like "Fast Times At Ridgemont High," "The Blue Lagoon" and "The
Exorcist" may be prohibited by the Child Protection Act.0 7 With suffi-
cient evidence regarding the age of the children involved and whether
such depictions satisfy the definition of section 2251 et seq. producers of
such materials may be subject to prosecution. This is unlikely since
prosecutorial distaste for these types of educational, medical and artistic
portrayals is not as strong as the distaste for films like "Those Young
Girls." Nevertheless, the very existence of the Act has a chilling effect
on constitutionally protected expression. Those who present books,
plays and films portraying teenagers cannot be singled out for punish-
104. Id. at 1424. Justice O'Connor's concurrence stated that the New York statute might
be overbroad because it "bans depictions that do not actually threaten the harms identified by
the Court." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 775 (1982). Justice O'Connor mentioned
clinical pictures of adolescent sexuality reproduced in medical textbooks as well as National
Geographic's pictures of children engaged in rites approved by their cultures as examples of
depictions regulated by the statute which may not "trigger the compelling interests identified
by the Court." Id. Justice O'Connor, however, brushed these examples aside and refused to
apply the overbreadth doctrine on the basis that this potential overbreadth was not sufficiently
substantial. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, also declined to apply the over-
breadth doctrine on the basis that such overbreadth was de minimis. Id. at 776. Justice Ste-
vens avoided the overbreadth analysis, postponing it until actually confronted with a case that
presents facts where application of the statute is overbroad. Id. at 780.
105. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1431.
106. Id.
107. United States v. Reedy, 632 F. Supp. 1415, 1421 n.15 (W.D. Oki. 1986).
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ment simply because they address teenage sex in a realistic and nonob-
scene manner. 1
0 8
In addition to prohibiting the production of such materials, section
225 1(a) interferes with the right of young performers to compete for roles
in nonpornographic works simply because a single scene may fit one of
the statutory definitions."°9 It is precisely this sort of deterrence of pro-
tected expression that the first amendment guards against.
The Child Protection Act does not merely have a marginal affect on
freedom of speech. The Act abridges the constitutional rights of all those
involved in artistic expression such as producers, writers and young per-
formers. Additionally, audiences' first amendment interests are in-
fringed. Thus, a substantial sector of the film and theater industry is
affected by the Child Protection Act and such effect should not be con-
sidered de minimis: "[t]he overbreadth of Section 2251 is not limited
simply to situations which are rare and insignificant.""'
IV. CONCLUSION
The court in Kantor concluded that the definition of "sexually ex-
plicit conduct" in section 2251(a) of the Child Protection Act is not suit-
ably limited and described because the "potential encroachment upon the
first amendment is not properly directed to the legitimate objectives of
protection of children from the abuses of child pornography.""' Fur-
thermore, the court said it would easily conclude that, given such unsuit-
ability and the chilling effect on protected expression, the potential
overbreadth of section 2251(a) is substantial and should be struck down
facially:" 2 "Congress should be sent back to the task of designing a stat-
ute, the reach of which is more clearly limited to the protection of
children." ' 13
However, the Kantor court concluded section 225 1(a) could "not be
struck down facially, at least until such time as a case is presented in
which the alleged overbreadth of the statute is urged by someone affected
by it.""' 4 This conclusion was colored by the fact that the overbreadth
issue was presented to the court in the defendants' motion to dismiss,
rather than during a trial on the merits, and in the context of "Those
108. People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 679, 422 N.E.2d 523, 526 (1981), rev'd 458 U.S. 747
(1982).
109. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1432.
110. Id.
111. Id
112. Id.
113. Id
114. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1432.
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Young Girls," a film which clearly falls within the category of speech
covered by the Child Protection Act.
Although the court in Kantor postponed such a decision until it ac-
tually arises, the constitutionality of the Child Protection Act, particu-
larly section 2251(a), will be challenged and eventually struck down
under the first amendment overbreadth doctrine. Kantor is a preview
illustrating how courts will react when confronted with the overbreadth
issue of the Child Protection Act.
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